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ZAHN V. INTERNATIONAL PAPER CO.: THE
NON-AGGREGATION RULE IN JURISDICTIONAL
AMOUNT CASES
William H. Theis*
The general federal question jurisdiction statute' and the diver-
sity jurisdiction statute2 each provide that, as one jurisdictional req-
uisite, the "matter in controversy" must exceed $10,000.1 The stat-
utes make no explicit provision for cases involving multiple parties
where only some or none of the parties asserts or defends against a
claim over this amount, although the aggregate of such claims may
exceed the required figure. The answers to problems like these have
been purely judge-made responses.4
In Zahn v. International Paper Co.,' the United States Supreme
Court again declined an invitation to change the content of these
rules.6 When the Court has spoken so recently and so emphatically
on an issue, it would not serve much purpose to make an extended
argument that the Court should have reached a contrary result.7 We
* Assistant Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1970) provides in part: "The district courts shall have origi-
nal jurisdiction of all civil actions wherein the matter in controversy exceeds the sum
or value of $10,000, exclusive of interest and costs, and arises under the Constitution,
laws, or treaties of the United States."
2. Id. § 1332 provides in part: "The district courts shall have original jurisdiction
of all civil actions where the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $10,000,
exclusive of interest and costs, and is between- (1) citizens of different States; (2)
citizens of a State, and foreign states or citizens or subjects thereof; and (3) citizens
of different States and in which foreign states or citizens or subjects thereof are addi-
tional parties."
3. Several important jurisdictional provisions have no amount-in-controversy re-
quirement. E.g., 28 U.S.C. §§ 1333, 1337, 1343 (1970).
4. See generally Note, 68 COLUM. L. REv. 1554 (1968); Note, 27 IND. L. J. 199
(1952); Note, 53 MINN. L. REV. 94 (1968); Note, 80 U. PA. L. REv. 106 (1931).
5. 414 U.S. 291 (1973).
6. It had previously declined a similar invitation in Snyder v. Harris, 394 U.S. 332
(1969), noted in 17 Loy. L. REV. 187 (1970); 24 U. MIAMI L. REV. 173 (1969); 24 Sw. L.
J. 354 (1970); 79 YALE L. J. 1577 (1970). See also Maraist & Sharp, After Synder v.
Harris: Whither Goes the Spurious Class Action? 41 Miss. L. J. 379 (1970).
7. Both the United States Supreme Court's opinion and the Second Circuit opin-
ion, 469 F.2d 1033 (2d Cir. 1972), have already generated a good deal of criticism. See
Note, 43 U. CINN. L. REV. 444 (1974); Recent Developments, A Class Action Brought
Pursuant to Federal Rule 23 (b) (3) and Under Diversity Jurisdiction Cannot Be
Maintained Where the Named Representatives Meet the Jurisdictional Amount But
Some Unnamed Plaintiffs Do Not, 73 COLUM. L. REV. 359 (1973) [hereinafter cited as
Recent Developments]; Comment, 41 FORD. L. REV. 991 (1973); Note, 35 OHIO ST. L.
J. 190 (1974); Note, 26 VAND. L. REV. 375 (1973). In addition, criticism of the Court's
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may expect to live with the Court's decision for some time-at least
until Congress takes corrective action. Hence, it is important to iden-
tify certain cases clearly to be discarded to the extent that they
anticipated a trend rejected in Zahn. Even more important is a con-
sideration of cases that, although purporting to follow traditional
doctrine, arguably stray from it.
ZAHN: NON-AGGREGATION AS AN OBSTACLE TO THE CLASS ACTION
In Zahn, plaintiffs sought damages in a class action on behalf of
themselves and approximately two hundred other owners and lessors
of lakefront property against defendant, whom they claimed to be
injuring them by polluting Lake Champlain. Although each repre-
sentative of the class had a claim over $10,000, the district court
denied class status to the action because it was not convinced that
each unnamed member of the class could satisfy the jurisdictional
amount.8 On appeal, the Second Circuit affirmed.' On a writ of cer-
tiorari, the United States Supreme Court again affirmed."0
Characterizing the case as falling within rather well-defined
rules, the Court refused to change those rules.
When two or more plaintiffs, having separate and distinct de-
mands, unite for convenience and economy in a single suit, it is
essential that the demand of each be of the requisite jurisdic-
tional amount; but when several plaintiffs unite to enforce a sin-
earlier opinion in Snyder covers substantially the same ground. See 7 C. WRIGHT & A.
MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1756 (1972) [hereinafter cited as WRIGHT
& MILLER]; Id. vol. 7A, § 1782; Bangs, Revised Rule 23; Aggregation of Claims for
Achievement of Jurisdictional Amount, 10 B.C. IND. & COM. L. REv. 601 (1969); Ka-
plan, A Prefatory Note to the Class Action-A Symposium, 10 B.C. IND. & COM. L.
REv. 497 (1969); Strausberg, Class Actions and Jurisdictional Amount: Access to a
Federal Forum-A Post Snyder v. Harris Analysis, 22 Am. U. L. REv. 79 (1972); Com-
ment, 16 WAYNE L. REv. 1085 (1970); Note, 79 YALE L. J. 1577 (1970).
8. Zahn v. International Paper Co., 53 F.R.D. 430, 430-31 (D. Vt. 1971). The
named plaintiffs made an allegation of jurisdictional amount as to themselves, but
none as to the unnamed members of the class. Purporting to apply the test of St. Paul
Mercury Indemnity Co. v. Red Cab Co., 303 U.S. 283 (1938), the trial judge speculated
that not every member could meet that case's "legal certainty" test. There is no
indication of any fact in the opinion to support his assertion. Although the trial court
makes a persuasive case for evaluating the unnamed members' claims when it did
rather than waiting until the res judicata effect of its judgment might be called into
question, 53 F.R.D. at 433-34, the Supreme Court gave no consideration to the pro-
priety of applying the legal certainty test at so early a stage in class litigation. Nor
did it question the trial court's rather lax application of the St. Paul rule, a laxness
inherent in its timing of the rule's application.
9. 469 F.2d 1033 (2d Cir. 1972).
10. 414 U.S. 291 (1973).
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gle title or right, in which they have a common and undivided
interest, it is enough if their interests collectively equal the juris-
dictional amount."
Regarding a Rule 23(b)(3) class action as "'in effect, but a congeries
of separate suits,' "12 where the parties are "related only by a common
question of law and fact, '1 3 the Court reached its conclusion by
merely applying the traditional rule to the facts of the case. The 1966
revision of Rule 23 eliminating the procedural consequences flowing
from the jural relationship among the class members in no way dis-
turbed, in the Court's view, the jurisdictional consequences attend-
ant upon the nature of that relationship."
Its earlier decision in Clark v. Paul Gray, Inc. ," although, of late,
not taken seriously by various commentators,"8 provided ample sup-
port for the Court's view." In that case, a number of automobile
dealers joined in a suit against state officials in an attack upon a
California tax statute. Finding that only one of the plaintiffs had a
claim in excess of the required jurisdictional amount, the Court dis-
missed the other parties for want of jurisdiction. Each plaintiff, ob-
served the Court, must establish jurisdictional amount as to his indi-
vidual claim. As the Zahn Court pointedly observed, it could hardly
exercise jurisdiction over claims lacking jurisdictional amount as-
serted on behalf of unnamed parties when it refused such an invita-
tion by named parties. 8
In the Court's view, the plaintiffs were asking it to "change the
Court's longstanding construction of the 'matter in controversy' re-
11. Id. at 294, quoting Troy Bank v. G.A. Whitehead & Co., 222 U.S. 39, 40-41
(1911).
12. 414 U.S. at 296, quoting Steele v. Guaranty Trust Co., 164 F.2d 387, 388 (2d
Cir. 1947).
13. 414 U.S. at 297. Fm. R. Civ. P. 23 provides in part: "(b) An action may be
maintained as a class action if ... the court finds that the questions of law or fact
common to the members of the class predominate over any questions affecting only
individual members, and that a class action is superior to other available methods for
the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy ... "
14. 414 U.S. at 301. But see Kaplan, Continuing Work of the Civil Committee:
1966 Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (1), 81 HARv. L. REv. 356,
400 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Kaplan]. For a brief explanation of amended Rule 23,
see C. WRIGHT,' LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 72 (2d ed. 1970) [hereinafter cited as
WRIGHT].
15. 306 U.S. 583 (1939).
16. See, e.g., Recent Developments 362-63.
17. Also, the Court's remarks in Snyder v. Harris, 394 U.S. 332, 336-37 (1969),
especially its approval of Alvarez v. Pan American Life Ins. Co., 375 F.2d 992 (5th Cir.
1967), make the Zahn decision not particularly surprising.
18. 414 U.S. at 301.
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quirement" 5 found in the diversity jurisdiction statute.20 Such a
change, maintained the Court, would undermine the intent of Con-
gress, which had continuously increased the dollar-amount figure of
the requirement with that constuction in mind. This implied ratifica-
tion of the Court's judicial gloss required Congressional action to
modify it.21
The majority opinion is remarkable for its silence on a major
issue: the possible ameliorating effect of "ancillary jurisdiction" on
the "non-aggregation" rule.22 Although the recent case of United
Mine Workers v. Gibbs2 3 gave the ancillary jurisdiction doctrine new
impetus, 24 cases dating from the previous century have allowed the
federal courts to take jurisdiction over claims not independently
within their jurisdiction if these claims are sufficiently related to
claims fully possessed of the necessary jurisdictional requisites.2 Ju-
risdiction over a "case" has been thought broad enough to allow
consideration of factually related claims so long as at least one claim
meets the federal jurisdictional requirements." Ancillary jurisdiction
19. Id.
20. The Court's opinion clearly contemplates that its holding will extend as well
to federal question cases brought under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1970). 414 U.S. at 302 n.ll.
21. In this regard, the Court echoed its views in Snyder v. Harris, 394 U.S. 332,
338-41 (1969).
22. This silence is all the more remarkable in the face of the provocative discus-
sion of ancillary jurisdiction in Justice Brennan's dissent, 414 U.S. at 302-12, and in
Judge Timbers' dissent, 469 F.2d at 1036-40.
23. 383 U.S. 715 (1966). For a discussion of Gibbs, see Shakman, The New Pen-
dent Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts, 20 STAN. L. REV. 262 (1968); Note, 81 HAav.
L. REV. 657 (1968); Note, 44 TEx. L. REV. 1631 (1966). See also Baker, Toward a
Relaxed View of Federal Ancillary and Pendent Jurisdiction, 33 U. Prrr. L. REv. 759
(1972); Note, 62 COLUM. L. REV. 1018 (1962); Note, 51 IOWA L. REV. 151 (1965).
24. Gibbs sanctioned the use of what might be more precisely termed "pendent
jurisdiction," assumption of power over an alternative claim or ground of relief based
on state law which the plaintiff asserts against the defendant in a federal question case.
However, Gibbs is consistent with the more general principle that jurisdiction over a
"case" gives jurisdiction over constituent parts not within the court's jurisdiction had
they been pressed separately and independently from the rest of the case. The Court's
favorable reference to the numerous procedural devices designed to bring additional
parties into a lawsuit as an impetus for its decision certainly implies that the Court
considered its decision in accord with the more general principle of ancillary jurisdic-
tion. 383 U.S. at 724. For a fuller discussion of the terminological difference between
"ancillary jurisdiction" and "pendent jurisdiction," see 1 W. BARRON & A. HOLTZOFF,
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 23 (1960, Supp. 1970).
25. E.g., Ex parte Tyler, 149 U.S. 164 (1893); Phelps v. Oaks, 117 U.S. 236 (1886);
Krippendorf v. Hyde, 110 U.S. 276 (1884); Freeman v. Howe, 65 U.S. (24 How.) 450
(1861).
26. See, e.g., Siler v. Louisville & N.R.R., 213 U.S. 175 (1909); Warren G. Kleban
Eng'r Corp. v. Caldwell, 490 F.2d 800 (5th Cir. 1974).
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has served to justify intervention,27 permissive joinder of parties,28
joinder of claims, 9 compulsory counterclaims," crossclaims,3" and
impleader. 2 The doctrine has been used with equal facility in both
27. E.g., Witchita R.R. & Light Co. v. Public Util. Comm'n, 260 U.S. 48 (1922);
Phelps v. Oaks, 117 U.S. 236 (1886); Stewart v. Dunham, 115 U.S. 61 (1885). WRIGHT
& MILLER, vol. 7A, § 1917 summarizes the law as follows: Intervention under FED. R.
Civ. P. 24(a) may be accomplished through the use of ancillary jurisdiction, unless the
proposed intervening party falls within the limits of FED. R. Civ. P. 19(b). In the latter
instance, intervention must be denied, and the action dismissed. Ancillary jurisdic-
tion, moreover, may not be employed to effect intervention under FED. R. Civ. P. 24(b).
Of course, not all claims asserted under Rule 24(b) would meet the "common nucleus
of operative fact" test established in Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 725. However, the authors may
be unwarranted in discounting the force of Witchita, which cuts against their position.
They maintain that Witchita is no longer pertinent because the procedural rules have
so drastically changed the device of intervention. Nevertheless, as Zahn so well illus-
trates, changes in procedural rules have not altered the Court's jurisdictional pron-
ouncements. Given the facts of Witchita, one may conclude that permissive interven-
ors may also utilize ancillary jurisdiction.
28. E.g., Mas v. Perry, 489 F.2d 1396 (5th Cir. 1974); Schulman v. Huck Finn,
Inc., 472 F.2d 864 (8th Cir. 1973); Almenares v. Wyman, 453 F.2d 1075 (2d Cir. 1971);
Leather's Best, Inc. v. S.S. Mormaclynx, 451 F.2d 800 (2d Cir. 1971); Astor-Honor, Inc.
v. Grosset & Dunlap, Inc., 441 F.2d 627 (2d Cir. 1971); Kletschka v. Driver, 411 F.2d
436 (2d Cir. 1969); Connecticut General Life Ins. Co. v. Craton, 405 F.2d 41 (5th Cir.
1968). As discussed in the text at note 42 infra, the Supreme Court has reserved opinion
on the propriety of this development. Moor v. County of Alameda, 411 U.S. 693 (1973).
The Fifth Circuit has recently followed this lead and avoided comment on the issue,
notwithstanding its prior remarks. Mobile Oil Corp. v. Kelley, 493 F.2d 784 (5th Cir.
1974). For commentary, see Fortune, Pendent Jurisdiction- The Problem of
"Pendenting" Parties, 34 U. PITT. L. REv. 1 (1972); Comment, 73 COLUM. L. REv. 153
(1973); Comment, 20 Loy. L. REV. 176 (1974). In any event, ancillary jurisdiction has
not been thought proper to effect the joinder of parties under FED. R. Civ. P. 19. See
Ranger Ins. Co. v. United Housing of New Mexico, Inc., 488 F.2d 682 (5th Cir. 1974);
Morrison v. New Orleans Pub. Serv. Inc., 415 F.2d 419 (5th Cir. 1969).
29. Forest Laboratories, Inc. v. Pillsbury Co., 452 F.2d 621 (7th Cir. 1971);
Schwab v. Erie Lackawanna R.R., 438 F.2d 62 (3d Cir. 1971), noted in 46 N.Y.U.L.
REV. 634 (1971), 50 TEX. L. REV. 537 (1972); Beverly Hills Nat'l. Bank & Trust Co. v.
Compania de Navegacione Almirante S.A., 437 F.2d 301 (9th Cir. 1971); Adkins v.
Kelly's Creek R.R., 338 F. Supp. 888 (S.D. W.Va. 1970), aff'd, 458 F.2d 26 (4th Cir.
1972). Cf. River Brand Rice Mills, Inc. v. General Foods Corp., 334 F.2d 770 (5th Cir.
1964); Hazel Bishop, Inc. v. Perfemme, Inc., 314 F.2d 399 (2d Cir. 1963); Pursche v.
Atlas Scraper & Eng'r Co., 300 F.2d 467 (9th Cir. 1962).
30. Moore v. New York Cotton Exchange, 270 U.S. 593 (1926). For a discussion
of this area, see Green, Federal Jurisdiction over Counterclaims, 48 Nw. U. L. REV.
271 (1953).
31. E.g., Consolo v. Federal Maritime Comm'n, 383 U.S. 607, 617n.14 (1966);
Scott v. Fancher, 369 F.2d 842 (5th Cir. 1966); Childress v. Cook, 245 F.2d 798 (5th
Cir. 1957).
32. E.g., United States v. United Pac. Ins. Co., 472 F.2d 792 (9th Cir. 1973);
Schwab v. Erie Lackawanna R.R., 438 F.2d 62 (3d Cir. 1971); H.L. Peterson Co. v.
S.W. Applewhite, 383 F.2d 430 (5th Cir. 1967); Stemler v. Burke, 344 F.2d 393 (6th
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federal question and diversity cases.3 Rather than fragment a case,
the federal courts have attempted to resolve the dispute with the
greatest possible convenience and economy if the claims arise from a
"common nucleus of operative fact."34 However, this liberality has
not, until recently, manifested itself in cases where the lacking juris-
dictional requisite is the jurisdictional amount."
An uneasy, seldom acknowledged tension has always existed be-
tween the non-aggregation rule and the broader concept known as
ancillary jurisdiction. 8 Zahn well illustrates and perpetuates the ten-
sion that has resulted from the side-by-side growth of these two lines
of cases inconsistent in broad principle. Some years ago the Court
decided that only the named parties in a class suit need have diver-
sity from the opponent of the class.37 To be consistent, the Zahn Court
should have allowed the retention of the unnamed parties' claims
which were lacking in jurisdictional amount. Since both diversity and
amount in controversy are jurisdictional requisites, it is not apparent
Cir. 1965); Pennsylvania R.R. v. Erie Ave. Warehouse Co., 302 F.2d 843 (3d Cir. 1962);
Southern Milling Co. v. United States, 270 F.2d 80 (5th Cir. 1959); Dery v. Wyer, 265
F.2d 804 (2d Cir. 1959); Waylander-Peterson Co. v. Great N. Ry., 201 F.2d 408 (8th
Cir. 1953).
As long as the original claim is within the court's subject matter jurisdiction, the
third-party claim need not meet original subject matter jurisdiction requirements.
However, once a third-party defendant is impleaded, the original plaintiff must meet
the jurisdictional requisites if he desires to assert a claim against the third-party
defendant. Kenrose Mfg. Co. v. Fred Whitaker Co., No. 72-1007 (4th Cir. Aug. 7, 1972),
aff'g 53 F.R.D. 491 (W.D. Va. 1971), noted in 30 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 295 (1973);
Friend v. Middle Atlantic Transp. Co., 153 F.2d 778 (2d Cir. 1946). On the other hand,
a third-party defendant desirous of asserting a claim against the original plaintiff may
use ancillary jurisdiction to dispense with normal jurisdictional requisites. Revere
Copper & Brass, Inc. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 426 F.2d 709 (5th Cir. 1970), noted in
59 Ky. L. J. 506 (1970); 49 N.C.L. Rsv. 503 (1971). For further discussion of these
issues, see Note, 51 Nw. U. L. REv. 354 (1956); Note, 57 VA. L. REV. 265 (1971).
33. See, e.g., Supreme Tribe of Ben-Hur v. Cauble, 255 U.S. 356 (1921); Phelps
v. Oaks, 117 U.S. 236 (1886); Freeman v. Howe, 65 U.S. (24 How.) 450 (1861); Mas v.
Perry, 489 F.2d 1396 (5th Cir. 1974); Scott v. Fancher, 369 F.2d 842 (5th Cir. 1966).
34. United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725 (1966).
35. See notes 57, 80-81 infra.
36. Compare Almenares v. Wyman, 453 F.2d 1075 (2d Cir. 1971), with Zahn v.
International Paper Co., 469 F.2d 1033 (2d Cir. 1973). See note 38 infra.
37. Supreme Tribe of Ben-Hur v. Cauble, 255 U.S. 356 (1921). Although the
district court's opinion in this case describes the plaintiffs' interest as "common but
indivisible," Id. at 361, the Court's use of ancillary jurisdiction does not rest on any
principle analogous to that underlying the non-aggregation rule. Its discussion of
Stewart v. Dunham, 115 U.S. 61 (1885), to support its conclusion indicates that the
nature of the plaintiffs' interest was unimportant to its holding. Rather, jurisdiction
over the named parties' claim was sufficient to give jurisdiction over the unnamed
parties' claim. Moreover, the district court's characterization of the parties' jural rela-
tionship appears to be incorrect. See Kaplan 380-81.
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why, for reasons of convenience and economy, one may be dispensed
with through the use of ancillary jurisdiction and the other may not.3"
The Court's argument that Congress had impliedly ratified its
interpretation of the statute's "matter in controversy" language does
not adequately resolve this anomalous situation. 9 In fact, no direct
evidence suggests that Congress, by tinkering only with the dollar
amount figure in the statute, meant to approve the Court's judicial
gloss on "matter in controversy." If Congress kept in mind the
Court's gloss on the statute as it enacted successive versions, that
awareness must have included a recognition that the Court's inter-
pretation of "case" 40 in its development of ancillary jurisdiction
sharply conflicted with its reading of "matter in controversy." One
could then reasonably infer that, if Congress, perceiving this irra-
tional tension, had any intentions in this area, it would intend for the
Court to sort out its wildly conflicting doctrines. Less reasonable is
the inference that Congress intended to ossify the Court's construc-
tion of "matter in controversy" and allow this conflict to continue.,'
The Court's "head-in-the-sand" attitude about the interaction of
ancillary jurisdiction with the non-aggregation rule cannot be justi-
fied by the Court's implied assertion that Congress also had its head
in the sand. Unfortunately, at this point, only the Congress, not
appellants, can set the matter straight.
Nor would it be reasonable to conclude that Zahn affects the use
of ancillary jurisdiction in other situations. The Court's silence cuts
both ways, preserving intact both lines of cases, as inconsistent as
they may seem. The continued vitality of ancillary jurisdiction is
illustrated by a United States Supreme Court case decided less than
a year before Zahn. In Moor v. County of Alameda,2 the Court point-
38. See Stewart v. Dunham, 115 U.S. 61 (1885), where the Court allowed interven-
tion of non-diverse parties in the trial court, but dismissed appeals as to those parties
in whose favor a judgment below the appellate jurisdictional amount had been ren-
dered. Appeals were heard only where the appellee had recovered a judgment in excess
of the jurisdictional amount. The Court made no comment about this disparity.
39. The Court did not even mention its argument in Snyder v. Harris, 394 U.S.
332, 340 (1969), that the jurisdictional amount requirement must be maintained to
insure the independence of state governments. In a case like Snyder, where no plain-
tifrs claim met the jurisdictional amount, perhaps the argument had force. Zahn,
however, is difficult to distinguish from Ben-Hur. Hence, the Court was driven to its
implied ratification argument.
40. In fact, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1332 (1970) use the phrase "civil action" rather
than "case", but the Court evidently considers the two terms synonymous in this
context. See United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725 (1966).
41. See generally Snyder v. Harris, 394 U.S. 332, 347-50 (1969) (Fortas, J., dissent-
ing); H. HART & A. SACKS, THE LEGAL PRocESS: BAsic PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND
APPLICATION OF LAW 1401-05 (tent. ed. 1958).
42. 411 U.S. 693 (1973).
1974]
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edly identified the issue, canvassed the authorities, and reserved
opinion in a federal question case where plaintiff attempted to em-
ploy ancillary jurisdiction to join an additional party defendant
against whom plaintiff asserted a claim that neither involved a fed-
eral question nor rested on diversity of citizenship. In light of so
recent a pronouncement and given the separate paths pursued by the
non-aggregation rule and ancillary jurisdiction, the Court's silence on
the latter doctrine in Zahn should not be implied to express any
opinion on the development of ancillary jurisdiction. Rather, by pre-
serving the non-aggregation rule, Zahn merely denies ancillary juris-
diction a natural area of expansion. The Court's opinion stresses its
desire to maintain the status quo. By preserving the non-aggregation
rule, the Court has doubtless preserved an anomaly, not destroyed it.
We may expect such a decision, if it comes at all, to be a more studied
approach.
If the Court were concerned about the unmanageable nature and
disruptive effects of the class action, it could have nevertheless ad-
mitted the existence of jurisdiction over the small, but related claims.
On the facts of the case, a class action would not necessarily proceed
after a finding of jurisdiction. If, on remand after a finding of jurisdic-
tion, the trial court were to refuse to entertain the smaller claims, it
would be acting within the permissible range of its discretion. Al-
though the facts giving rise to liability to each plaintiff sprang from
a common nucleus of operative fact, as required by Gibbs,43 computa-
tion of damages to individual parcels of real estate would have in-
volved numerous determinations of fact, each one unique to each
member of the class. There is every reason to believe that the Gibbs
theory of ancillary jurisdiction allows the district court enough discre-
tion to disentangle itself from such a gargantuan task if so minded.
Under Gibbs the court is not required to consider every ancillary
claim over which it has jurisdiction," but has discretion to decline to
hear some of these claims. By refusing to explore the jurisdiction-
discretion dichotomy of ancillary jurisdiction and by continuing to
follow the non-aggregation rule, the Court has frustrated the use of
class actions where, although the parties' interests are not "common"
in the narrow meaning of the non-aggregation rule, the litigation may
be as conveniently terminated for one plaintiff as for thousands of
plaintiffs. 5
43. United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725 (1966).
44. Id. at 726-27. See also Almenares v. Wyman, 453 F.2d 1075, 1085-86 (2d Cir.
1971). Additionally, one might conclude that a class action is not the appropriate
procedural device in a case of this sort. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3) (Committee Note
of 1966); Kaplan 393.
45. See Almenares v. Wyman, 453 F.2d 1075 (2d Cir. 1971).
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The Court's firmness on the jurisdictional point seems particu-
larly unnecessary in light of Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin," decided
shortly after Zahn. If one thinks that the class action needs to be
tamed,47 Eisen, with its insistence on personal notice to other mem-
bers of the plaintiff class, accomplishes the task much more effec-
tively. By and large, the class actions causing outcry and consterna-
tion have been in the antitrust and securities fraud areas, where no
jurisdictional amount is required. Eisen, not Zahn, places the most
severe limitations on actions in these as well as other areas.
Zahn's limitations, although ineffectual in many class actions,
may extend to other procedural devices noted for their convenience
to the parties and greatly circumscribe their utility. Viewed in this
light, Zahn presents us with a field ripe for Congressional action.
POST-ZAHN REASSESSMENT OF THE LOWER COURTS' EFFORTS IN CLASS
ACTION AND JOINDER CASES
Property
For the present, Zahn requires new efforts to understand and
apply a rule sometimes discarded or misapplied." The Court's classic
test permits aggregation only in a case where the plaintiffs "unite to
enforce a single title or right, in which they have a common and
undivided interest."49 The test seems workable enough in cases where
co-owners of property or interests in property bring suit. Thus, under
the rule co-owners of a lien on real estate may assert the total value
of the lien jointly held by them in order to meet the jurisdictional
amount." On the other hand, tenants in the same building may not
aggregate their claims in a class action against their landlord. 1 Each
tenant's leasehold interest is deemed separate and apart from his
neighbor's, although the leases creating all the interests may be quite
similar. Likewise, various property owners are not allowed to aggre-
46. 94 S. Ct. 2140 (1974).
47. See Handler, The Shift from Substantive to Procedural Innovations in Anti-
trust Suits-The Twenty-Third Annual Antitrust Review, 71 COLUM. L. REv. 1, 9
(1971), for an example of the criticism leveled at the class action.
48. Joinder and class action cases will be treated together without distinction in
light of the Court's view that they do not significantly differ with regard to the opera-
tion of the non-aggregation rule. See text at notes 15-18 supra.
49. Troy Bank v. G.A Whitehead & Co., 222 U.S. 39, 40-41 (1911).
50. Id.
51. Hahn v. Gottlieb, 430 F.2d 1243 (1st Cir. 1970); Potrero Hill Community
Action Comm. v. Housing Authority, 410 F.2d 974 (9th Cir. 1969); Mattingly v. Elias,
325 F. Supp. 1374 (E.D. Pa. 1971), rev 'd in part on other grounds, 482 F.2d 526 (3d
Cir. 1973); English v. Town of Huntington, 335 F. Supp. 1369 (E.D.N.Y. 1970).
1974]
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gate their claims to bring a class action to abate a nuisance, since
each has a separate interest in his own property." However, even in
cases of property rights, the courts apply the non-aggregation rule
with less than rigorous consistency. 3
Contracts
In order to aggregate contract rights, the plaintiffs must assert
rights so interlocked that one might lawfully demand payment for the
group and payment of this one creditor would serve as payment of the
entire group of creditors. Creditors in solido under the Louisiana Civil
Code most nearly approximate the creditors who, for federal jurisdic-
tional purposes, may aggregate their claims. 4 Aggregation is not per-
mitted when plaintiffs merely have similar contracts with defen-
dant;" nor, for that matter, would plaintiffs claiming rights from a
single document necessarily be able to aggregate their claims."
After Zahn, a case like F. C. Stiles Contracting Co. v. Home
Insurance Co. 57 may no longer be considered good law. Plaintiff sued
to enforce insurance contracts against three insurers, each of whom
had insured a percentage of the loss. The plaintiffs rights against any
one insurer were in no way dependant upon his rights against the
others. Two of the three individual claims were jurisdictionally insuf-
52. City of Inglewood v. Los Angeles, 451 F.2d 948 (9th Cir. 1972); accord, Alfonso
v. Hillsborough County Aviation Authority, 318 F.2d 724 (5th Cir. 1962). See also
Rogers v. Hennepin County, 239 U.S. 621 (1916); Wheless v. St. Louis, 180 U.S. 379
(1901); Jones v. North Bergen, 331 F. Supp. 1281 (D.N.J. 1971); Booth v. Lemont Mfg.
Corp., 304 F. Supp. 235 (N.D. Ill. 1969).
53. See Washington Market Co. v. Hoffman, 101 U.S. 112 (1879) (separate tenants
in one building could aggregate); Skokomish Indian Tribe v. France, 269 F.2d 555 (9th
Cir. 1959) (holders of separate parcels claiming to derive title from a common source
could aggregate).
54. See LA. CIv. CODE arts. 2088, 2091.
55. See Givens v. W.T. Grant Co., 457 F.2d 612 (2d Cir. 1972); Spears v. Robinson,
431 F.2d 1089 (8th Cir. 1970); Lonnquist v. J.C. Penney Co., 421 F.2d 597 (10th Cir.
1970); Eagle Star Ins. Co. v. Maltes, 313 F.2d 778 (5th Cir. 1963); Niagara Fire Ins.
Co. v. Dyess Furniture Co., 292 F.2d 232 (5th Cir. 1961); Hughes v. Encyclopaedia
Britannica, Inc., 199 F.2d 295 (7th Cir. 1952); Lesch v. Chicago & E.I.R.R., 279 F.
Supp. 908 (D. Il. 1968); Fratto v. Northern Ins. Co., 242 F. Supp. 262 (W.D. Pa. 1965),
aff'd, 359 F.2d 842 (3d Cir. 1966).
56. See Thomson v. Gaskill, 315 U.S. 442 (1942); Ex parte Phoenix Ins. Co., 117
U.S. 367 (1886); Aetna Ins. Co. v. Chicago, R.I. & P.R.R., 229 F.2d 584 (10th Cir. 1956);
United Bonding Ins. Co. v. Parke, 293 F. Supp. 1350 (E.D. Mo. 1968).
57. 431 F.2d 917 (6th Cir. 1970); accord, Beautytuft, Inc. v. Factory Ins. Ass'n,
431 F.2d 1122 (6th Cir. 1970); Hedberg v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 350 F.2d
924 (8th Cir. 1965); Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Jeppeson & Co., 344 F. Supp. 1381 (D.
Nev. 1972); Lucas v. Seagrave Corp., 277 F. Supp. 338 (D. Minn. 1967); Dixon v.
Northwestern Nat'l. Bank, 276 F. Supp. 96 (D. Minn. 1967).
NON-A'GGREGATION RULE
ficient. Nevertheless, the court assumed jurisdiction over the entire
litigation permitting joinder of all defendants based on ancillary ju-
risdiction since all claims arose from a single incident. Because the
liability of each defendant was in no way solidary with the liability
of the others, this disposition would be inconsistent with the non-
aggregation rule as expressed in Zahn."
The cases in the area of contract law illustrate a weakness in the
non-aggregation rule which at first may not be apparent. Zahn's con-
tinued adherence to traditional doctrine holds out the promise of
certainty of result and ease of application," the hallmarks of a well-
articulated and coherent doctrine as it operates in both recurring and
novel fact situations. Such promise, however, may be somewhat illu-
sory. 10 Traditional doctrine in this instance consists of rules; but the
rules are supported by no unifying purpose or rationale, necessarily
creating uncertainty for the bar.'
The Court has divined reasons for the jurisdictional amount
requirements enacted by the Congress, but these policies furnish lit-
tle explanation for the judge-made definition of "matter in contro-
versy." It is often said that a jurisdictional amount is intended to
protect against the federal courts' degenerating into small claims
courts" and to prevent them from encroaching too heavily on the
concurrent jurisdiction of the state courts. 3 These, of course, are
valid concerns for the Congress, although they give minimal direction
to the essentially arbitrary choice made by Congress in setting a
dollar amount for the "matter in controversy." 4
They provide even less guidance in setting the definitions of
"matter in controversy." Congress tries to limit the number of cases
finding their way into the federal system, but does not define what it
means by a case. Zahn certainly allows fewer claims into the federal
system by reading "matter in controversy" narrowly to mean claim
or cause of action, and thus excluding any claim below the dollar
58. See notes 55-56 supra.
59. See 414 U.S. at 301, echoing Snyder v. Harris, 394 U.S. 332, 341 (1969).
60. See WRIGHT § 36, at 123.
61. Non-aggregation first received life in Oliver v. Alexander, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 143
(1832), which involved the amount for the Court's appellate jurisdiction. Some sixty
years-after Oliver, the Court for the first time invoked the non-aggregation rule to set
the boundaries of a district court's original jurisdiction. It made no analysis of why a
similar rule would be equally appropriate in gauging the extent of original jurisdiction.
Walter v. Northeastern R.R., 147 U.S. 370 (1893).
62. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 1830, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 3-4 (1958).
63. See Snyder v. Harris, 394 U.S. 332, 339-40 (1969); Healy v. Ratta, 292 U.S.
263, 270 (1934).
64. See generally Zahn v. International Paper Co., 414 U.S. 291, 294n.3 (1973).
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amount fixed by Congress. However, a test which results in fewer
claims gaining entrance to the federal courts promotes the goals be-
hind a jurisdictional amount requirement only if "claim" has the
same meaning as "matter in controversy." The only approval the
Court's circular reasoning can command is the fictional approval of
Congress found in its re-enactment of the statute with nothing more
than a change in dollar amount. 5
This deficiency of reasoning becomes readily apparent when one
confronts the well-established rule that a single plaintiff may aggre-
gate against a single defendant multiple claims that are totally unre-
lated either factually or legally.6 That these multiple unrelated
claims are held by one person, not many, may be an entirely fortui-
tous circumstance. Yet, when asserted by one person, the unrelated
claims are presumably less of an inconvenience to the court and drain
on its resources; moreover, they presumably represent no siphoning
off of responsibility best left with the state judiciary. It is difficult to
justify this difference in treatment. If the federal court does not want
to try many small, unrelated claims, it should not draw any distinc-
tion when one plaintiff presents it with the same claims it would
refuse to try if asserted by numerous parties. Likewise, if the inde-
pendence of state government would be diminished were parties to
join claims, it is equally diminished when one party aggregates unre-
lated claims.
Uncertainty of purpose leads to questionable results when, for
example, one plaintiff with an adequate claim unites with another
plaintiff who claims a common and undivided interest, but only in a
jurisdictionally insufficient amount. In Sterling Construction Co. v.
Humboldt National Bank,"7 plaintiff bank sued for a sum in excess
of $10,000, allegedly its due under an assignment of payments for
65. See notes 19-21, 39-41 supra and accompanying text.
66. See Snyder v. Harris, 394 U.S. 332, 335 (1969); Crawford v. Neal, 144 U.S.
585 (1892); Hales v. Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc., 500 F.2d 836 (4th Cir. 1974); Matthew v.
Swift & Co., 465 F.2d 814 (5th Cir. 1972); Litvak Meat Co. v. Baker, 446 F.2d 329 (10th
Cir. 1971); Lynch v. Porter, 446 F.2d 225 (8th Cir. 1971); Siegerist v. Blaw-Knox Co.,
414 F.2d 375 (8th Cir. 1969); Lemmon v. Cedar Point, Inc., 406 F.2d 94 (6th Cir. 1969);
Stone v. Stone, 405 F.2d 94 (4th Cir. 1968); Lloyd v. Kull, 329 F.2d 168 (7th Cir. 1964);
Helgesson v. Helgesson, 295 F.2d 37 (lst Cir. 1961); Pearson v. National Soc'y of Pub.
Accountants, 200 F.2d 897 (5th Cir. 1953).
67. 345 F.2d 994 (10th Cir. 1965); accord, Phoenix Ins. Co. v. Woosley, 287 F.2d
531 (10th Cir. 1961). To the same general effect is Stone v. Stone, 405 F.2d 94 (4th
Cir. 1968), although the Fourth Circuit employed ancillary jurisdiction to reach its
decision. To the extent that Stone relied on ancillary jurisdiction, its reasoning is
discredited by Zahn. However, its result is quite in accord with the above cases, which
purport to follow traditional doctrine.
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construction work done for defendant by its borrower. The assign-
ment was security for a $10,000 note signed by the borrower and a co-
signer. The bank then brought suit against the defendant company
which should have honored its assignment rights. The co-signer
joined the suit. Since the co-signer had paid the note, he arguably
held a common and undivided interest with the bank as to only
$10,000 of the assignment rights. However, the Tenth Circuit rather
facilely looked to the total amount demanded by the bank and, find-
ing a common and undivided interest between the parties, upheld
jurisdiction. The court completely overlooked the fact that the com-
mon and undivided interest between the two failed to satisfy the
jurisdictional amount.
Similarly in Manufacturers Casualty Insurance Co. v. Coker,6"
the Fourth Circuit allowed an insurer to bring a declaratory judgment
action against its alleged insured and his victims. None of the latter
had a claim in excess of the jurisdictional amount, although the value
of the alleged insured's policy exceeded the jurisdictional amount.
Although they arose from one accident, the victims' claims were sepa-
rate and distinct from each other under the traditional test. Even if
each claimant might be viewed as having a common interest with the
insured, the extent of that common interest, as to each, did not
exceed the value of his individual claim. Although the court's deci-
sion may have conveniently disposed of what could have been a com-
plicated tangle, it arguably violated a rule not formulated with con-
venience in mind.
That these cases present questionable results becomes apparent
if one compares Coker with Motorists Mutual Insurance Co. v.
Simpson,"0 in which an insurer brought an action against two judg-
ment creditors of its alleged insured for a declaration of non-coverage.
One defendant had recovered a substantial judgment for the death
of her husband; the other, for property damage done to the truck
driven by its employee, the decedent. The policy in question provided
a limit of $10,000 for personal injury and $5,000 for property damage.
Although both potential claims arose from the same collision and
depended upon an interpretation of the same contract, the court
observed that the interests of the defendants were separate and dis-
tinct. Their non-aggregability could not be avoided through a decla-
ratory judgment action in which plaintiff asserted a possible liability
of $15,000.70 This decision apparently conforms with Zahn except one
68. 219 F.2d 631 (4th Cir. 1955).
69. 404 F.2d 511 (7th Cir. 1968). See also Lauf v. Nelson, 246 F. Supp. 307 (D.
Mont. 1965).
70. See generally Skelly Oil Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 339 U.S. 667 (1950).
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cannot help but wonder if joinder of the alleged insured might have
produced a different result, as in Coker. In fact, the alleged insured
had assigned his rights against the insurer for its bad faith refusal to
settle to the wife of the decedent, who asserted them as a compulsory
counterclaim. Yet the Seventh Circuit, closing its eyes to the value
of the counterclaim, found jurisdictional amount lacking.7 It is hard
to see why this type of case would have plunged the federal court into
trifling affairs and sapped the local judiciary of its independence,
when a case fitting the Coker pattern does not."
Nonetheless, the technicalities of the non-aggregation rule in its
day-to-day applications are well enough understood that one can
expect a rather transparent attempt to circumvent it completely by
resort to a "defendant's viewpoint" standard for determining juris-
dictional amount. It is often said that the jurisdictional amount is
determined from the "plaintiff's viewpoint"-the benefit to him of
what he seeks, not the detriment to the defendant." Although there
are cases in which the Court seemed to value the matter in contro-
versy from the defendant's standpoint,74 the Court's present view
toward aggregation makes unlikely a resort to a defendant's view-
point standard in a multi-party case where the non-aggregation rule
results in a finding that no plaintiff or only some plaintiffs have a
satisfactory amount in controversy. In Zahn itself, the defendant's
total exposure to liability would have been well over $10,000, had the
class action been allowed to proceed. Non-aggregation is squarely at
odds with a "defendant's viewpoint" standard, and so the lower
courts have held. 75
Cases in which plaintiffs have sought recovery for a "common
71. Contra, Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Horton, 275 F.2d 148 (5th Cir. 1960), aff'd
on other grounds, 367 U.S. 348 (1961). In Simpson, the widow later asserted her claim
in another federal district court and recovered a substantial judgment against the
insurer. Simpson v. Motorists Mut. Ins. Co., 494 F.2d 850 (7th Cir. 1974).
72. Perhaps the case was not one appropriate for declaratory relief. See Cun-
ningham Bros. Inc. v. Bail, 407 F.2d 1165 (7th Cir. 1969).
73. For a classic statement of the traditional "plaintiff's view" doctrine, see
Dobie, Jurisdictional Amount in the United States District Court, 38 HAv. L. REV.
733, 734 (1925).
74. E.g., Mississippi & M.R.R. v. Ward, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 485 (1862). See also
The "Mamie," 105 U.S. 773 (1881); Market Co. v. Hoffman, 101 U.S. 112 (1879);
Shields v. Thomas, 58 U.S. (17 How.) 3 (1854), where the Court allowed aggregation
of plaintiffs' claims.
75. Massachusetts Pharmaceutical Ass'n v. Federal Prescription Serv. Inc., 431
F.2d 130 (8th Cir. 1970); Lonnquist v. J.C. Penney Co., 421 F.2d 597 (10th Cir. 1970);
Comment, 68 Nw. U. L. REV. 1011, 1015-20 (1964). But see generally Hatridge v. Aetna
Cas. & Sur. Co., 415 F.2d 809 (8th Cir. 1969).
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fund"76 do not support resort to a defendant's viewpoint standard.
Only if the parties' substantive rights are such that one may demand
payment for all and payment to him would extinguish the rights of
all, may the aggregate of the claim, the "common fund," be regarded
as jurisdictionally sufficient." "Common fund," a technical term
consistent with the non-aggregation rule's plaintiff viewpoint stan-
dard, is equal to the defendant's total exposure to liability. But it is
erroneous to equate the defendant's exposure to liability, without
regard to the nature of the plaintiff's rights, to a "common fund"
permitting aggregation.
This rigorous approach was distorted in Bass v. Rockefeller,"
where welfare recipients brought a class action to prevent the termi-
nation of benefits. The court found a "common fund" by viewing the
fund as one held by the defendant. It is true, as the court pointed out,
that the defendant administrator's total exposure to liability ex-
ceeded $10,000; but this hardly makes for a common fund in the
legally technical sense. If defendant held a fund, it was as a party
adverse to the plaintiffs' rights. He was trying to defeat their claims,
not assert them. It is undisputed that the recipients' rights were such
that no one of them could have demanded payment for the group and
discharged the defendant from his responsibilities to each and every
member of the group, because their interests were separate and dis-
tinct.
The court's desire to take jurisdiction over this case is commend-
able. Plaintiffs were asserting a federal right based on narrow grounds
that would not have embroiled the court in numerous determinations
of fact peculiar to each member of the class.7" But the traditional rule
allows aggregation only if plaintiff's rights are common and undi-
vided. Examination of the defendant's total exposure to liability, as
in Bass, renders the non-aggregation rule meaningless. The Zahn
opinion gives no indication that the Court would favor such an ob-
vious effort to frustrate its rule.
Torts
Tort litigation has provided even more instances of departure
76. E.g., Koster v. Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co., 330 U.S. 518 (1947); Gibbs v.
Buck, 307 U.S. 66 (1939); Bullard v. City of Cisco, 290 U.S. 179 (1933).
77. Berman v. Narragansett Racing Ass'n, 414 F.2d 311 (1st Cir. 1969).
78. 331 F. Supp. 945 (S.D.N.Y. 1971), vacated as moot, 464 F.2d 1300 (2d Cir.
1971); accord, United Low Income, Inc. v. Fisher, 470 F.2d 1074 (1st Cir. 1972); Har-
mony Nursing Home, Inc., v. Anderson, 341 F. Supp. 957 (D. Minn. 1972). See also
Stamps v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 300 F. Supp. 545 (W.D. Ark. 1969).
79. See text at note 45 supra.
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from and misapplication of the traditional rules. Shortly before Zahn
some lower courts began to employ ancillary jurisdiction over small
claims factually related to claims of sufficient jurisdictional
amount.80 Often when a person suffers injury, a parent, spouse or
child may also claim damages for loss of support, loss of consortium,
or medical expenses. A number of courts, sympathetic to the conveni-
ence of trying these related claims together, have assumed jurisdic-
tion over all claims, even those lacking jurisdictional amount.8 ' To
the extent that these cases relied on the considerations found in
Gibbs, they are no longer good law; that the plaintiffs' injuries arose
from the same incident in no way makes for a common and undivided
interest.2
The traditional doctrine is not always consistently applied in
cases in which various members of the same family seek to recover
damages resulting from injury to one member. In Louisiana a hus-
band's claim for lost wages of his wife cannot be aggregated with her
personal claims for pain and suffering. Because the claim for lost
wages belongs to the community, of which the husband is head and
master, it is considered separate from the wife's personal claim for
aggregation purposes, even though the wife has the procedural capac-
ity to assert the claim. 83
On the other hand, the Fifth Circuit has ruled that beneficiaries
of an action for wrongful death and survival damages may aggregate
their claims. In Kelly v. Hartford Accident and Indemnity Co. ,4 five
80. E.g., Stone v. Stone, 405 F.2d 94 (4th Cir. 1968); Jacobson v. Atlantic City
Hosp. 392 F.2d 149 (3d Cir. 1968).
81. E.g., Greene v. Basti, 391 F.2d 892 (3d Cir. 1968); Wilson v. American Chain
& Cable Co., 364 F.2d 558 (3d Cir. 1966); Langsam v. Minitz, 346 F. Supp. 1340 (E.D.
Pa. 1972); Townsend v. Quality Court Motels, Inc., 338 F. Supp. 1140 (D. Del. 1972);
Wiggs v. City of Tullahoma, 261 F. Supp. 821 (E.D. Tenn. 1966); Morris v. Gimbel
Bros., Inc., 246 F. Supp. 984 (E.D. Pa. 1965); Raybould v. Mancini-Fattore Co., 186
F. Supp. 235 (E.D. Mich. 1960). See generally Hatridge v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 415
F.2d 809 (8th Cir. 1969). The American Law Institute has proposed that a federal court
take jurisdiction over a claim by one member of a family that may be insufficient in
amount, so long as it is joined with another claim arising out of the same incident
which is sufficiently large and pressed by another member of the same family. ALI,
STUDY OF THE DIVISION OF JURISDICTION BETWEEN STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS § 1301(e)
(1969).
82. Hymer v. Chai, 407 F.2d 136 (9th Cir. 1969); Arnold v. Troccoli, 344 F.2d 842
(2d Cir. 1965); Muse v. United States Cas. Co., 306 F.2d 30 (5th Cir. 1962); Payne v.
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 266 F.2d 63 (5th Cir. 1959); Redden v. Cincinnati,
Inc., 347 F. Supp. 1229 (N.D. Ga. 1972); Del Sesto v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 201
F. Supp. 879 (D.R.I. 1962).
83. Muse v. United States Cas. Co., 306 F.2d 30 (5th Cir. 1962); accord, Starks
v. Louisville & N.R.R., 468 F.2d 896 (5th Cir. 1972).
84. 294 F.2d 400 (5th Cir. 1961).
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beneficiaries brought suit under article 23155 in state court for
$50,000. The defendant removed the action. To defeat plaintiffs' ar-
gument that the court lacked removal jurisdiction, the court held
that there was a common and undivided interest in $50,000, not five
separate, jurisdictionally insufficient claims of $10,000 each.
Although, under the jurisprudence surrounding article 2315, all
parties must join to assert their claims,"6 it is inaccurate to say that
their rights are common and undivided for purposes of the non-
aggregation rule. There is no suggestion in the case law that settle-
ment with and release by one beneficiary would settle and release his
co-beneficiaries' claims. If the injured party can settle and release his
claim for personal injuries without compromising his ultimate benefi-
ciaries' claims for wrongful death," there is no reason to believe that
their rights are such that any one of them may assert or release the
rights of the group. Their compulsory joinder under state law is a
procedural rule which does not affect the nature of the interest as-
serted by each one."' Their rights are "common" only in the sense
that each relies on a single incident to recover; "undivided," only in
the sense that they must compulsorily join under state procedure."
A state procedural rule requiring their joinder does not make the
nature of their interest common and undivided for federal jurisdic-
tional purposes. 0
It is somewhat disconcerting to note, however, that a United
85. LA. Civ. CODE art. 2315 gives both a survival action and a wrongful death
action to certain named beneficiaries.
86. Reed v. Warren, 172 La. 1082, 136 So. 59 (1931).
87. See Johnson v. Sundberry, 150 So. 299 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1933).
88. See Oliver v. Alexander, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 143 (1832) (Compulsory joinder of
plaintiffs; no common and undivided interest). If anything, Reed v. Warren seems to
say that its rule of compulsory joinder is based, at least in part, on considerations of
convenience to the defendant, not the nature of the interest asserted by the plaintiffs.
Reed v. Warren, 172 La. 1082, 1092-93, 136 So. 59, 63 (1931).
89. Shields v. Thomas, 58 U.S. (17 How.) 3 (1854), an appellate jurisdiction case,
could be used to argue that the beneficiaries' interest in the survival action is common
and undivided. Even so, each beneficiary could sue only if his wrongful death claim,
plus the amount of the survival action, exceeded $10,000. It cannot be argued that the
beneficiaries' claims are common and undivided with respect to the wrongful death
action. Each beneficiary receives compensation based on a number of factors so numer-
ous and so sensitive that recovery could vary widely from one beneficiary to another,
even though their respective losses resulted from the same death. More importantly,
Shields seems to rest on a "defendant's viewpoint" of jurisdictional amount. To that
extent, it should not be considered good law. See notes 73-75 supra and accompanying
text.
90. Cf. Morrison v. New Orleans Publ. Serv., Inc., 415 F.2d 419 (5th Cir. 1969)
(FED. R. Civ. P. 19, not state law found in Reed v. Warren, establishes the criteria for
compulsory joinder of parties).
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States Supreme Court decision seems to support the result in Kelly.
In Texas & Pacific Railway v. Gentry,"' the Court found appellate
jurisdiction to exist in an action for death damages prosecuted by the
relatives of a deceased. Although one relative recovered less than the
jurisdictional amount, her recovery was aggregable with the total
recovery of her group to determine appellate jurisdiction.
While there was in form a separate judgment in favor of each of
the persons for whose benefit the action was brought, the statute
of Texas creates a single liability on the part of the defendant,
and contemplates but one action for the sole and exclusive bene-
fit [of the named beneficiaries] . . . .Such an action as this can
be brought by all the parties interested, or by any one of them
for the benefit of all. . . . The jury found that the damages sus-
tained by the deceased were $10,166.66. That was the amount in
dispute. The 'matter in controversy' was the liability of the defen-
dant company in that amount by reason of the single injury com-
plained of. If the defendant was liable in that sum . . . it was of
no concern to it how that amount was divided among the parties
entitled to sue on account of the single injury alleged to have been
committed.2
If Gentry is to have any continuing validity we must immediately
rule out the procedural capacity of one party to assert claims on
behalf of another as a basis for a "single liability." 3 The procedural
capacity of a class representative to press the claims of the class did
not affect the rule laid down in Zahn. Rather, the decision in Gentry
seems to rest on the proposition that, since only one lawsuit may be
brought, that lawsuit, depending on its outcome, will bar or merge
the rights of all beneficiaries, regardless of who brings it.4 However,
this rationale may also be discounted in light of Zahn. In that case,
the claim preclusive effects that would have flowed from the use of a
procedural device," the class action, were considered irrelevant in the
face of a jurisdictional rule." Gentry should not detract from Zahn's
91. 163 U.S. 353 (1896); accord, Insurance Co. of North America v. Chinowith, 393
F.2d 916 (5th Cir. 1968).
92. Texas & Pac. Ry. v. Gentry, 163 U.S. 353, 360-61 (1896).
93. See Euge v. Trantina, 422 F.2d 1070 (8th Cir. 1970); Muse v. United States
Cas. Co., 306 F.2d 30 (5th Cir. 1962).
94. It seems clear from the provisions of Texas law quoted by the Court that only
one action, whether by all of the beneficiaries, some of them on behalf of all, or by the
decedent's administrator on behalf of all, could be brought. Texas & Pac. Ry. v.
Gentry, 163 U.S. 353, 355, (1896).
95. See WRIGHT § 72, at 311.
96. Cf. Healy v. Ratta, 292 U.S. 263, 267 (1934). That the Court in Gentry allowed
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most recent formulation of the rule: the substantive nature of the
plaintiffs' rights, not the procedural means to enforce them, nor the
defendant's total exposure to liability, determines the aggregability
of the claims. 7
Actions under the Louisiana Direct Action Statute98 illustrate, in
a tort context, further arbitrariness and inconsistency of the non-
aggregation rule. It is clear that numerous plaintiffs injured in one
incident may not aggregate their joined claims against one defendant
tortfeasor." Nor may they do so in a direct suit against the insurer
alone.00 Their claims against one insurer arising from one incident do
not generate a common and undivided interest. Further, even though
multiple tortfeasors might be solidarily liable to a plaintiff, 10' suit
against their insurers alone does not allow aggregation of the claims
against the insurers. 02 However, suit against a tortfeasor and his
insurer has been held to warrant aggregation even though the policy
limit is less than the jurisdictional amount. 03 This result calls into
play the same logical leap we saw earlier:'0" the existence of solidary
liability obscures questions about the extent of liability as measured
in dollars. Thus, suit against insurer alone when the policy limit is
$5,000 must be brought in state court. However, joinder of the insured
with a prayer against him for an amount in excess of $10,000, which
he may or may not have the financial means to pay, allows suit to go
forward against insurer as well as insured in federal court.0 5
the desire for the claim preclusive effects of compulsory joinder to give content to a
jurisdictional rule merely renders the Zahn opinion all the more suspect in its claim
that its non-aggregation rule has been long-standing and unchanging.
97. To the extent that the decision also rests on a "defendant's viewpoint" stan-
dard, Gentry is of doubtful validity. See note 73-75 supra and accompanying text.
98. LA. R.S. 22:655 (1950), as amended by La. Acts 1962, No. 471 § 1.
99. See Eagle Star Ins. Co. v. Maltes, 313 F.2d 778 (5th Cir. 1963); Payne v. State
Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 266 F.2d 63 (5th Cir. 1959); Robison v. Castello, 331 F.
Supp. 667 (E.D. La. 1971); Bish v. Employer's Liability Assur. Corp., 102 F. Supp.
343 (W.D. La. 1952), aff'd, 202 F.2d 954 (5th Cir. 1953).
100. See Eagle Star Ins. Co. v. Maltes, 313 F.2d 778 (5th Cir. 1963).
101. See Sovereign Camp Woodmen of the World v. O'Neill, 266 U.S. 292 (1924);
McDaniel v. Traylor, 196 U.S. 415 (1905); Michie v. Great Lakes Steel Div. 495 F.2d
213 (6th Cir. 1974).
102. Dendinger v. Mutual Cas. Co., 302 F.2d 850 (5th Cir. 1962).
103. Fulton v. White Cab Co., 305 F. Supp. 1333 (E.D. La. 1969).
104. See text at notes 67-68 supra.
105. Robison v. Costello, 331 F. Supp. 667 (E.D. La. 1971) goes so far as to allow
aggregation of the claim against the plaintiff's driver's insurer under an uninsured
motorist provision with the claim against the defendant uninsured motorist. It is not
apparent how Robison differs from Jewell v. Grain Dealers Mut. Ins. Co, 290 F.2d 11
(5th Cir. 1961), where plaintiff could not aggregate his claim against his insurer with
his claim against the other driver and the latter's insurer.
1974]
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
SOME OBSERVATIONS ABOUT NON-AGGREGATION AND IMPLEADER UNDER
RULE 14
Until now, discussion has focused on the non-aggregation rule in
joinder and class action cases. Remarkably enough, the rule does not
seem to have reared its head in other procedural contexts, for exam-
ple, third-party actions under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 14.
Only a handful of cases have considered whether a third-party de-
mand must meet the jurisdictional amount, assuming that the main
claim is sufficient. Resorting to ancillary jurisdiction,"6 the courts
have concluded that jurisdictional amount in the third-party demand
may be dispensed with so long as the original claim presents the court
with sufficient subject matter jurisdiction.' 7
Although impleader under Rule 14 is a convenient tool, non-
aggregation logically should be applied in these cases just as rigor-
ously as it is in class action or joinder cases. Consider a simple exam-
ple. A sues B for injuries amounting to $15,000. B then files a third-
party demand against his alleged co-tortfeasor C for contribution in
the sum of $7,500. Although A could have sued both B and C in
solido, the fact is that he did not. Consideration of A's common and
undivided right to recovery against B and C seems amiss. Rather one
must compare for commonality the rights of A versus B and the rights
of B versus C. Although these rights arise from a common nucleus of
operative fact, they are hardly common and undivided. As a legal
matter, A is completely indifferent to whether B recovers from C;
their respective rights are separate and distinct. If one plaintiff may
not drag another plaintiff into court "on his coattails"'0 8 through the
use of a class action, one defendant can hardly "turn plaintiff" and
bring another defendant into court on his coattails.
CONCLUSION
For reasons not entirely satisfactory, the Court has refused to
temper the non-aggregation rule by use of the ancillary jurisdiction
doctrine. The task of the lower courts, then, is to proceed in strict
106. See 3 J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 14.26, at 14-530 (2d ed. 1974): "If the
concept of ancillary jurisdiction is applicable to cases where diversity of citizenship is
lacking, a fortiori, it should apply where the question is merely one of jurisdictional
amount."
107. King v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 274 F. Supp. 824 (W.D. Ark. 1967);
Schinella v. Iron Workers Local 361, 149 F. Supp. 5 (E.D.N.Y. 1957); Schram v. Roney,
30 F. Supp. 458 (E.D. Mich. 1939).
108. Zahn v. International Paper Co., 414 U.S. 291, 301 (1973), quoting from the
Second Circuit's opinion, 469 F.2d 1033, 1035 (1972).
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conformity with the rule. Although this course may produce incon-
venient and anomalous results, that seems the intent of the Court,
which viewed neither inconvenience nor anomaly as cause to abrogate
its rule. Perhaps a strict adherence to the rule might more quickly
bring the legislative change invited by the Court.
